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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by Respondent to recover money
on a contract for services allegedly performed.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Lower Court granted Respondent's iftotion for Summary
Judgment and denied Appellants' motion to Amend their Answer,
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek a reversal of the Lower Court's order
granting Respondent's motion for Summary Judgment as well as
a reversal of the Lower Court's denial of Appellants' motion to
amend their Answer.

Appellants further seek a remand of this

action to the Lower Court with instructions to grant Appellants
leave to amend their Answer and/or to grant Appellants a trial
on the merits of the issues raised in their Answer.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 1, 1972, Respondent and Appellants entered into
an "Agreement" [hereinafter referred to as the Agreement] (Record
pp. 3-4) whereby Appellants agreed to deed all of their right,
title and interest in a certain Reber property to Respondent in
exchange for Respondent's arranging for the "annexation" or
"transaction" of a certain 890 acres of land [hereinafter referred
to as the Johnson land] "into" the City of Ivins in order that
the Johnson land would be able to obtain a source of water for

residential development.

This Agreement was amended by an "Adden-

dum" [hereinafter referred to as the Addendum] (Record p. 5) dated
September 6, 19 72.

The Addendum provided that, instead of trans-

ferring their interests in the Reber property to Respondent, Appellants would pay Respondent $15,000.00 within fourteen days after
the "annexation" of the aforesaid Johnson land "into" the City of
Ivins.

Neither the Agreement nor the Addendum contained integration

clauses.
Subsequently Appellants and the City of Ivins negotiated
afPre-Incorporation Agreement" [hereinafter referred to as the
Pre-Incorporation Agreement].

Negotiation and performance of this

Pre-Incorporation Agreement were seen by Appellants as being
conditions precedent to the "annexation" of the Johnson land to
the City of Ivins because the Pre-Incorporation Agreement contained
certain conditions and covenants providing for a supply of water
to the Johnson land for developmental purposes.

(Record p. 7).

Performance of the covenants and conditions under this Pre-Incorporation Agreement, however, was never completed. (Record p. 7).
Nevertheless the City of Ivins passed a resolution purporting to
annex the Johnson land.

Appellants, of course, acquiesced in

this resolution only to the extent that their purpose in seeking
"annexation/1 i.e. obtaining a water supply, had been or would be
achieved.
Respondent, believing that the action taken by the City
of Ivins was sufficient to constitute an "annexation" within

vii

the meaning of the Agreement and Addendum, brought the instant
action to recover the $15,000.00 which he felt was due and owing
him from Appellants.

Appellants, on the other hand, denied in

their Answer that "annexation" had occurred, noting that the parties
to the Agreement and Addendum intended that "annexation" be contingent on the City of Ivins1 performance of those Pre-Incorporation covenants and conditions pertaining to the delivery of a
water supply to the Johnson land.

vii

(Record p. 7).

ARGUMENT I:

ON HIS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, RESPONDENT

FAILED TO SHOW THE NON-EXISTENCE OF ANY GENUINE ISSUE OF
MATERIAL FACT AND FAILED TO SHOW THAT HE WAS ENTITLED TO A
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

U.R.C.P. 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall be
rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, ansv/ers to interrogatories,
and admissions on filed, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law."
A*

Genuine Issues of Material Fact.
The primary factual dispute in the present case is: What

did Respondent and Appellants mean by their use of the term
"annexation" in the Agreement and Addendum?

More specifically

—

did Respondent and Appellants intend, as Appellant argues, that the
term "annexation" would include an arrangement for a supply of
water adequate to facilitate development of the Johnson land as
stated in the Pre-Incorporation Agreement?

If so, was this arrange-

ment performed when Appellants negotiated their Pre-Incorporation
Agreement with the City of Ivins, or did performance of this
arrangement remain dependent upon the City of Ivins1 de facto
delivery of a water supply for developmental purposes to the
Johnson land?

If arrangement for a water supply was not seen by

1

Respondent and Appellants as being an integral element of
"annexation/1 was "annexation" of the Johnson land to the City
of Ivins accomplished in any other sense?

More specifically

—

was actual performance of the Pre-Incorporation Agreement oetween
Appellants and the City of Ivins regarded by Respondent and
Appellants as a condition precedent to "annexation?"

And without

actual performance of the Pre-Incorporation Agreement — was
"annexation" accomplished even according to the most narrowly
technical legal meaning which can be assigned to that term?
It is clear that Respondent's and Appellants1 pleadings
place in dispute the various answers which can be given to the
questions of what was meant by annexation and whether or not
annexation has actually occurred.

Thus, genuine issues of

material fact were raised in the Lower Court, the resolution of
which was not amenable to summary judgment procedure.
In addition to the Respondent's and Appellants1 pleadings,
however, Respondent submitted, in conjunction with his motion for
summary judgment, two affidavits to show the non-existence of any
genuine issue of material fact with respect to the "annexation"
of the Johnson land.

These affidavits, however, fall short of

making this necessary showing.
First, neither affidavit speaks to the critical issue of
Respondent's and Appellants' contractual intent relative to their
use of the term "annexation."

The factual question as to whether

the parties intended that the term "annexation" would include some
sort of arrangement for a water supply to the Johnson land remains
7

unaffected by the conclusory opinions expressed in these affidavits that "annexation" has occurred.

Thus Respondent's affi-

davits suggest that an "annexation" of some sort may have been
accomplished, but they do not suggest that "annexation/1 as that
term was or may have been interpreted by Respondent and Appellants
themselves, has been accomplished.

Nor do these affidavits suggest

that any arrangement for a water supply to the Johnson land, as
intimated in the affirmative defense raised in Appellants' answer,
was not an integral part of the "annexation" Agreement.
Ordinarily the purpose of a summary judgment procedure is
to pierce pleadings and to assess the proof of the parties in
order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.

And,

therefore, ordinarily where affidavits are submitted in support
of a party's motion for summary judgment "an adverse party may
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial."

U.R.C.P. 56(e).

However, as indicated above, "where the evidentiary matter
in support of the motion [for summary judgment] does not establish
the absence of a genuine issue [of material fact], summary judgment must be denied even if no opposing evidentiary matter is
presented."

(Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, for example, "where an

issue as to a material fact cannot be resolved without observation
of the demeanor of witnesses in order to evaluate their credibility,

3

summary judgment is not appropriate."

Advisory Committee's Notes

on Amendments in 1963 to FED, R. CIV. P. 56(e), found in Cound,
Friedenthal and Miller, 19 74 Civil Procedure Supplement 158 (1974).
And in Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970)
the United States Supreme Court noted that:
[p]ointing to PvUle 56(e), as amended in 1963,
Respondent argues that it was incumbent on
Petitioner to come forward with an affidavit
properly asserting the presence of [facts]
. . . to avoid summary judgment. Respondent
notes in this regard that none of the materials
upon which Petitioner relied met the requirements
of Rule 56(e). This argument does not withstand
scrutiny, however, for both the commentary on and
background of the 19 6 3 amendment conclusively
show that it was not intended to modify the burden
of the moving party under Rule 56(c) to show initially the absence of a genuine issue concerning
any material facts. The advisory committee note
on the amendment states that the changes were not
designed to 'affect the ordinary standards applicable to the summary judgment.' And, in a comment
directed specifically to a contention like Respondent's, the committee stated that 'where the
evidentiary matter in support of the motion does
not establish the absence of a genuine issue,
summary judgment must be denied even if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented.' Because
Respondent did not meet its initial burden of
establishing [facts that would justify summary
judgment] . . . Petitioner here was not required
to come forward with suitable opposing affidavits.
Not only do Respondent's affidavits fail to address the issue of
contractual intent involved here —

but also, the entire intent

problem, especially where oral understandings between the parties
may be concerned, seems irresolvable without some opportunity for
a trier of fact to observe "the demeanor of witnesses in order to
evaluate their credibility."

For these reasons Respondent failed,

through the use of affidavits on his motion for summary judgment,
4

to establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,
and Appellants were, therefore, under no obligation to support
the allegations and denials of their Answer by counter-affidavit
or otherwise.
Second, Respondent's affidavits did not establish the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the
"annexation11 controversy because they were insufficient to prove
that an "annexation," even in the most narrowly technical legal
sense, occurred.
Looking, for instance, to the affidavit
Ence, a councilman in the City of Ivins —

of Rodney T.

Mr. Ence states

essentially that (a) the City of Ivins town council "approved
the Johnson addition" and annexed said Johnson addition to the
City of Ivins, and that (b) the annexation plat was reported
with the Washington County Recorder.
It is clear, however, that a legally binding annexation
in Utah requires much more than ad hoc resolutions and the recording of an annexation plat.

Utah Code Annotated, §10-3-1 (1953)

provides, inter alia, that persons desiring annexation must file
a petition in the office of the Recorder or town Clerk of the
city or town to which annexation is desired, and that said petition
must be signed by a majority of the real property'owners and by
the owners of not less than one-third in value of the real property
which it is desired to annex.

Furthermore, §10-3-1 requires that

"an ordinance shall be passed, declaring the annexation," and that

|
i
i
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!

a "certified copy of the ordinance declaring such annexation
. • . shall . . . be filed in the office of the County Recorder,"
It does not appear from the affidavit of Rodney T. Ence whether
these statutory conditions to annexation have been satisfied.
This Court has expressly stated that these statutory conditions
are not mere technicalities; they are "absolute requirement[s]."
Peterson v. Bountiful City, 25 Utah 2d 126, 477 P.2d 153 (1970).
See, for instance, Jensen v. Bountiful City, 20 Utah 2d 159, 435
P.2d 284 (1967) (annexation declared void because a majority of
property owners not represented on annexation petition); and
Johnson v. Sandy City Corporation, 28 Utah 2d 22, 497 P.2d 644
(1972) (annexation declared void because certified copy of the
ordinance declaring annexation had not been filed with County
Recorder's office within a reasonable time).

Mr. Ence's failure

to include in his affidavit a statement to the effect that all
of these "absolute requirements" for annexation have been met
could in no way create a basis in the record alone for the trial
court to conclude that they had been met.
This initial presumption against the sufficiency of Mr.
Ence's affidavit to show that an annexation of the Johnson land
to the City of Ivins had, in fact, occurred becomes almost irrebuttable in light of the additional facts that Appellants'
petition for annexation was conditioned on acceptance and performance by the City of Ivins of Appellants' Pre-Incorporation
Agreement; that said Pre-Incorporation Agreement was never performed by the City of Ivins; and that since majority property

owner support for annexation was conditioned on performance
by the City of Ivins of Appellants' Pre-Incorporation Agreement,
failure to perform said Pre-Incorporation Agreement by the City
of Ivins effected a withdrawal of majority property owner support
for the proposed annexation, thus rendering the City of Ivins
annexation resolution null and void.

Jensen v. Bountiful City,

supra; see also Peterson v. Bountiful City, supra.

The establish-

ing of conditions precedent to annexation in such Pre-Incorporation
Agreements is a procedure specifically approved by this Court*
Bradshaw v. Beaver City, 27 Utah 2d 135, 493 P.2d 643 (1972).

The

fact that these conditions precedent have not been met by either
Appellants or the City of Ivins suggests that annexation, as the
Respondent defines that term, has not occurred.
The affidavit of Floyd Rnce, Respondent in the present
case, adds nothing to the affidavit of his son, Rodney T. Ence,
which has just been discussed.

Indeed Respondent's affidavit

states in highly conclusory fashion that the Johnson land "was
annexed to the City of Ivins" on or about August 9, 19 73.

This

statement suffers from the same defects as those found in the
affidavit of Rodney T. Ence; viz. it is inadequate to demonstrate
substantial compliance by the City of Ivins with the statutory
requirements for annexation.

Additionally it would appear that,

if it is Respondent's purpose to prove by affidavit that annexation
occurred in a narrowly technical, legal sense, irrespective of any
supplementary meanings which Respondent and Appellants may have
attached to said term —

then the question of whether annexation

occurred would be a question of "ultimate fact" and Respondent's
conclusory opinion, set forth in his affidavit, that the Johnson
land "was annexed" is inadmissable for a trial purpose, and hence
for summary judgment purposes.

See U.R.C.P. 56(e); Walker v,

Rocky Mountain Recreation Corporation, 29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d
538 (1973) ; and Western States Thrift and Loan Company v. Blomquist,
29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019 (1972).
Because Respondent's affidavits do not speak to the
relevant factual dispute involved in the present case, i.e., the
issue of contractual intent with respect to the term "annexation;"
and even if we accept Respondent's interpretation of the relevant
factual dispute in the present case, i.e., whether "annexation"
occurred in a narrow legal sense, because Respondent's affidavits
are insufficient to prove his own version of that factual dispute
due to their incomplete character and due to their character as
opinion testimony, Respondent has failed to meet his burden of
showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, and,
therefore, summary judgment was improperly granted in the Lower
Court in Respondent's favor.
Third, the affidavit of Rodney T. Ence submitted in support
of Respondent's motion for summary judgment cannot assist him in
sustaining his burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue
of material fact for one final reason:
properly served upon Appellants.

Said affidavit was not

U.R.C.P. 6(d) provides that

"when a motion is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be
served with the motion . . . "
motion

for s u m m a r v

U.R.C.P. 56(c) provides that a

iiiflampnf "qhnl 1 ho ar>r-xrorl nf

i^no4- in /*«»,«

before the time fixed for the hearing,"

The Record reveals that

Rodney T. Ence's affidavit was prepared on October 15, 1975 while
the hearing on Respondent's motion for summary judgment took place
on October 15, 19 75.

Thus there is no conceivable way in which

Appellants could have received the requisite ten day notice.
Appellants did not consent to this untimely service.

Even

if it had been necessary for Appellants to prepare counter-affidavits in response to the affidavit of Rodney T. Ence, Appellants
obviously were given insufficient notice and time under U.R.C.P.
6(d) and 56(c) to prepare such a response.

And thus even if the

affidavit of Rodney T. Ence can be said to have contradicted the
allegations or denials of Appellants' Answer, because of Respondent's
failure to abide by the mandates of U.R.C.P. 6(d) and 56(c), said
affidavit was improperly considered by the Lower Court in passing on
Respondent's motion for summary judgment.
B.

Appellants are not precluded as a matter of law from introducing

parol evidence to show the intent of Respondent and Appellants
relative to their use of the term "annexation" in the Agreement
and Addendum.
From the preceding argument it can be seen that genuine
issues of material fact exist in the present case.

These issues

of material fact must be resolved by a trier of fact unless
Appellants are barred as a matter of law from proving their factual
version of what Respondent and Appellants meant by their use of
the term "annexation" in the Agreement and Addendum.

The only

potential bar to the introduction of this proof is the parol
evidence rule.
There are two basic reasons why the parol evidence rule
does not bar the admission of evidence extrinsic to the Agreement

"annexation."
First, the parol evidence rule applies only to integrated
agreements.

Whether the Agreement and Addendum involved in the

present case were integrated agreements is a question of material
fact and, therefore, irresolvable on a motion for summary judgment.
Furthermore, under any theory of fact interpretation, the Agreement and Addendum involved in the present case were not integrated
agreements.
The parol evidence rule is defined by the Restatement,
Contracts, §237, as follows:
. . . the integration of an agreement makes inoperative to add to or to vary the agreement all contemporaneous oral agreements relating to the same
subject matter; and also, unless the integration
is void, or voidable and avoided, all prior oral
or written agreements relating thereto. If either
void or voidable and avoided, the integration
leaves the operation of prior agreements unaffected.
Thus, invocation of the parol evidence rule is contingent upon the
existence of an "integrated agreement."

If no "integrated agree-

ment" exists, then the parol evidence rule cannot serve to bar the
introduction of evidence extrinsic to the contractual writing in
question.
Restatement, Contracts, §228, defines "integrated agreement" as a situation where " . . . the parties thereto adopt a
writing or writings as the final and complete expression of the
agreement.

An integration is the writing or writings so adopted."

The test to be applied in determining whether an "integrated
agreement" exists —

according to the Restatement Comment — is:

. . . that the parties shall have manifested assent
not merely to the provisions of their agreement, but
to the writing or writings in question as a final
statement of their intentions as to the matters contained therein.
This Court in Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 2 8 Utah 2d
261, 501 P.2d 266 (1972) after expressly approving the Restatement
version of the parol evidence rule outlined above, went on to
state that:
Whenever a litigant insists that a writing
that is before the Court is an integration and
asks the application of the parol evidence rule,
the Court must determine as a question of fact
whether the parties did in fact adopt a particular
writing or writings as the final and complete expression of their bargain. In determining the
issue of the completeness of the integration in
writing, evidence extrinsic to the writing itself
is admissable. Parol testimony is admissable to
show the circumstances under which the agreement
was made and the purpose for which the instrument
was executed . . . Whether a document was or was
not adopted as an integration may be proved by any
relevant evidence.
Thus the question of integration is itself a question of
material fact and is, therefore, not amenable to resolution on a
motion for summary judgment.

Moreover —

under any conceivable

theory of fact interpretation, the Agreement and Addendum involved
in the present case were not integrated agreements.

This can be

seen by comparing the facts of the present case with the fact
situation found in a similar case, Security Leasing Company v.
Flinco, Inc., 23 Utah 2d 252, 461 P.2d 460 (1969).

There Defendant

Flinco had leased a computer and tab card punch control from
Plaintiff Lessor.

Four separate documents executed intermittently

over a twelve-month period governed this transaction.

A completion

certificate was signed by both parties providing that:
[a]11 installations or other work necessary to
the use thereof have been completed; that said
chattels have been examined and/or tested and
are in good operating order or condition/ and
are in all respects satisfactory to undersigned
and as represented, and that said chattels have
been accepted by undersigned for the purpose of
said equipment lease.
Subsequently, Flinco became dissatisfied with the equipment performance and stopped payment.

Plaintiffs instituted an action to

recover on the leasing contract.
of justifiable rescission —

Flinco defended on the basis

that the equipment did not perform

in accordance with the parties1 agreement.

This agreement, accord-

ing to Flinco, included an oral promise to program the computer
so that it would operate effectively for purposes of Defendant's
business.

In upholding the trial judge's allowance of parol

evidence to establish the contents of this oral agreement,
Justice Crockett wrote:
The foundation which must be established
before the [parol evidence] rule has application
is that there is in fact a contract in writing which
represents the complete agreement between the
parties. Where the circumstances are such that
it is evident that the writing does not cover
some essential aspect of the transaction, outside
evidence may be resorted to determine what was to
be done about it. Inasmuch as the method of operation of this computer is such that it could not perform
the intended service for Flinco unless it was programed into the latter's business, and the documents
referred to do not spell out what was to be done about
that aspect of the service, it was not only permissable, but necessary that the trial court receive and
consider other evidence to resolve the dispute between the parties as to whether the documents represented their complete agreement.
Applying the Flinco court's rationale to the facts of the instant

case —

what could be a more "essential aspect" of developing

property than a water supply?

It seems manifestly unreasonable

to Appellants that a developer would pay $15f000.00 for a purely
formal "annexation" without some understanding that the customary,
and in this case specific, purpose for obtaining annexation, i.e.,
the acquisition of such a water supply, would be likewise achieved.
For these reasons it appears dubious that the Agreement and
Addendum involved in the present case were seen by the Respondent
and Appellants as being "integrated" writings.
Second, even if the Agreement and Addendum did constitute
a "integrated" contract between Respondent and Appellants, the
parol evidence rule is inapplicable here because the term
"annexation" is inherently ambiguous.

Nowhere within the four

corners of the Agreement and Addendum does a definition of the
term "annexation" appear.

Likewise nowhere within the four

corners of the Agreement and Addendum is any indication given as
to what the term "annexation" might mean.

In the absence of any

attempt by Respondent and Appellants themselves to make this term's
meaning explicit, and given the multifarious meanings which conceivably can be assigned to this term, it is apparent that some
evidence extrinsic to the Agreement and Addendum must be introduced
to enable a trier of fact to ascertain the intended meaning of
"annexation."

See Continental Bank & Trust Company v. Stewart, 4

Utah 2d 228, 291 P.2d 890 (1955); Continental Bank & Trust Company v.
Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 306 P.2d 773 (1957); Dayton v. Gibbons and
Reed Company, 12 Utah 2d 296, 365 P.2d 801 (1961); and Builough v.

Sims, 16 Utah 2d 304, 400 P.2d 20 (1965).
Because the Agreement and Addendum involved in the present
case were not integrated contractual writings and because, even
if they were, the term "annexation11 contained therein is inherently ambiguous, the parol evidence rule is inapplicable to said
Agreement and Addendum and Appellants are not precluded as a matter
of law from introducing parol evidence to show the intent of the
parties relative to their use of the term "annexation" in said
Agreement and Addendum,

ARGUMENT 2:

THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING

APPELLANTS1 MOTION TO AMEND THEIR ANSWER.
Appellants1 contend that the Lower Court's abuse of discretion here consisted of its entering an order granting summary
judgment in Respondent's favor when the more appropriate and
equitable alternative of allowing Appellants' to amend their
Answer existed.

Even if it is conceded that Appellants1 Answer was

defective in that it failed to put issues of material fact into
dispute between the parties —

the Lower Court's awareness that

Appellants had attempted to accomplish this purpose in drafting
their Answer and its awareness that Appellants, if given a reasonable opportunity, could have plead defenses of oral collateral
agreement, reformation or failure of consideration with greater
specificity so as to put issues of material fact into dispute
between the parties, thus making summary judgment inappropriate,
required the Lower Court to grant Appellants' Motion to Amend

their Answer.

To suggest otherwise would be to exalt the virtue

of technically adequate pleadings over the policy of affording
parties to a lawsuit every reasonable opportunity of having their
claims litigated on the merits.

The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

and Utah case law both display a decided preference for this policy
of giving a party to a lawsuit his day in court.
U.R.C.P. 15(a) provides that leave to amend pleadings
"shall be freely given when justice so requires."

And commentators

have recognized that "the entire spirit of the rules is to the
effect that controversies shall be decided on the merits/1 and
that "the courts have not been hesitant to allow amendments for
the purpose of presenting the real issues of the case, where the
moving party has not been guilty of bad faith. . . . the opposing
party will not be unduly prejudiced and the trial of the issues
will not be unduly delayed."
at 873-875 (1974).
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The Supreme Court of the United States has

stated that:
Rule 15(a) declares that leave to amend 'shall
be freely given when justice so requires;1 this mandate
is to be heeded. . . if the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper
subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity
to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any
apparent or declared reason — such as undue delay, bad
faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant,
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing
party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility
of amendment, etc. — the leave sought should, as the
rules require, be 'freely given.1 Of course, the grant
or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the
discretion of the District Court, but outright refusal
to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion; it
is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with
the spirit of the Federal RHIPQ

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962).
In recognizing and applying these principles the Utah
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the possibility of
undue delay or prejudice to an opposing party is proportionately
less in situations where no trial date has been set or where
discovery processes have not commenced.

For this reason motions

for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend are generally
discountenanced in Utah.

See, for example, Consolidated Steelcraft

v. Knowlton, 114 Utah 368, 199 P. 2d 149 (1948).

And even where,

as in Harman v. Yeagar, 100 Utah 30, 110 P. 2d 352 (1941), a
motion for judgment on the pleadings is in effect a "speaking
demurrer," the equivalent of our modern day summary judgment
procedure, the Court must construe the challenged pleading liberally
"with all reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded indulged
with a view to a trial on the merits and doing substantial justice
between the parties."

Or, if the challenged pleading is technically

insufficient, but there exists a "reasonable probability that .
[the pleader] could state a defense or make an issue on a matter
material to Plaintiff's cause of action," the Court must allow
an amendment to the otherwise defective pleading in order to
guarantee a full hearing on the merits of the entire controversy.
See Hancock v. Luke

46 Utah 26, 148 P. 452 (1915); Detroit Vapor

Stove Co. v. J. C. Weeter Lumber Co., 61 Utah 503, 215 P. 995
(1923); Johnston v. Brinkerhoff, 89 Utah 530, 57 P. 2d 1132 (1936);
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Clegg, 103 Utah 414, 135
P. 2d 919 (1943); and Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 165, 486 P.

2d 1045 (1971).

Naturally, therefore, because a "court cannot

ordinarily know that other facts to make the pleading good cannot
be pleaded . . . a refusal to permit pleading over where it does
not appear positive that no cause of action or defense can be
pleaded may run easily into an abuse of discretion."
v. Claudin, 63 P. 2d 570 (Utah, 1936).

Provo City

This is especially true

where the objection to a pleading goes to the form rather than
to the substance of that pleading; that isfwhere, because of
ambiguity, a pleading is technically deficient, "but where a good
defense might be pleaded the Court should not grant a judgment on
the pleadings where leave is asked to amend but should allow the
amendments to be made."
supra.

Consolidated Steelcraft v. Knowlton,

Even where a case is actually ripe for summary judgment,

or where, a summary judgment has been, in fact, granted, a motion
to amend pleadings will be denied only where the proffered amendment (a) would advance no new defense theories, (b) would not
contradict or explain the materials employed by Plaintiff in
support of his motion for summary judgment or (c) would not
effect a substantial change in the issues as they were formulated
in the original pleadings.
351 P. 2d 624 (1960).

See Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251,

Thus if the trial court is aware of facts

or grounds upon which new defense theories might be advanced or
by reason of which the materials employed by a movant in support
of his motion for summary judgment might be explained or contradicted so as to raise a genuine issue of material fact, it would
17

be inappropriate for the trial court to grant summary judgment
instead of "freely giving" the opposing party an opportunity to
amend his pleading and have a hearing on the merits of his claims.
See Sherman v. Hallbauer, 455 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1972).

And

thus where "the entire record reveals facts susceptible of
inferences that would justify an amendment of the pleadings and
save the action, a motion for summary judgment should not be
granted, but the party against whom the motion is directed should
be afforded an opportunity to amend his faulty pleading."

Castner

V. First National Bank of Anchorage, 278 F. 2d 376f 384 (9th Cir.
1960) .
Applying these principles of law to the facts of the instant
case it is readily apparent that the kower Court's order granting
Respondent's motion for summary judgment here was tantamount to
a "judgment on the pleadings."

No trial date had been set and

not a single discovery devi e had been employed by either party.
The only documents on record for the Lower Court to examine in
making its decision to grant Respondent's motion for summary judgment
were the Respondent's Complaint, the Appellants' Answer and two
rather inconclusive affidavits—one served on the morning of argument.
Thus a strong presumption against disallowance of a motion to
amend under these circumstances should have restrained the lower
Court from denying Appellants' motion to amend.

With nothing more

than essentially the pleadings to look to in making its determination whether to grant Respondent's motion for summary judgment
the trial Court, even if it found some technical deficiency in

Appellants' Answer, should have asked whether there was a "reasonable probability" that Appellants could "state a defense or make
an issue on a matter material to Plaintiff's cause of action,"
Clearly such a reasonable probability existed.

Appellants' Answer

not only expressly denies the existence of any "annexation"
within the meaning of the Agreement and Addendum, but also the
affirmative defense contained in that Answer that the City of
Ivins had breached its Pre-Incorporation Agreement suggests that
Respondent and Appellant had radically different understandings
and intentions with respect to the meaning of the term "annexation.
Furthermore the Lower Court was aware of the possibility that
these various oral or written collateral understandings or
agreements existed because it allowed Appellants "to argue
matters that were outside the pleadings"

(Record p. 2 3)•

at the October 15th hearing on Respondent's motion for summary
judgment.

This awareness—under the tests examined above—made

it incumbent on the Lower Court to grant Appellants' motion to
amend their Answer.

For these reasons Appellants contend that

the lower Court abused its discretion in denying Appellants' motion
to amend their Answer.
Respectfully submitted,
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